Human factors of flight-deck checklists: The normal checklist

Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as the foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or the non-use, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as the probable cause or at least a contributing factor to aircraft accidents. An attempt is made to analyze the normal checklist, its functions, format, design, length, usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. The development of the checklist from the certification of a new model to its delivery and use by the customer are discussed. The influence of the government, particularly the FAA Principle Operations Inspector, the manufacturer's philosophy, the airline's culture, and the end user, the pilot, influence the ultimate design and usage of this device. The effects of airline mergers and acquisitions on checklist usage and design are noted. In addition, the interaction between production pressures and checklist usage and checklist management are addressed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided

Human factors of the high technology cockpit

The rapid advance of cockpit automation in the last decade has outstripped the ability of the human factors profession to understand the changes in human functions required. High technology cockpits require less physical (observable) workload, but are highly demanding of cognitive functions such as planning, alternative selection, and monitoring. Furthermore, automation creates opportunity for new and more serious forms of human error, and many pilots are concerned about the possibility of complacency affecting their performance. On the positive side, the equipment works as advertized with high reliability, offering highly efficient, computer-based flight. These findings from the cockpit studies probably apply equally to other industries, such as nuclear power production, other modes of transportation, medicine, and manufacturing, all of which traditionally have looked to aviation for technological leadership. The challenge to the human factors profession is to aid designers, operators, and training departments in exploiting the positive side of automation, while seeking solutions to the negative side. Viewgraphs are given

Intervention strategies for the management of human error

This report examines the management of human error in the cockpit. The principles probably apply as well to other applications in the aviation realm (e.g. air traffic control, dispatch, weather, etc.) as well as other high-risk systems outside of aviation (e.g. shipping, high-technology medical procedures, military operations, nuclear power production). Management of human error is distinguished from error prevention. It is a more encompassing term, which includes not only the prevention of error, but also a means of disallowing an error, once made, from adversely affecting system output. Such techniques include: traditional human factors engineering, improvement of feedback and feedforward of information from system to crew, 'error-evident' displays which make erroneous input more obvious to the crew, trapping of errors within a system, goal-sharing between humans and machines (also called 'intent-driven' systems), paperwork management, and behaviorally based approaches, including procedures, standardization, checklist design, training, cockpit resource management, etc. Fifteen guidelines for the design and implementation of intervention strategies are included

Human factors of advanced technology (glass cockpit) transport aircraft

A three-year study of airline crews at two U.S. airlines who were flying an advanced technology aircraft, the Boeing 757 is discussed. The opinions and experiences of these pilots as they view the advanced, automated features of this aircraft, and contrast them with previous models they have flown are discussed. Training for advanced automation; (2) cockpit errors and error reduction; (3) management of cockpit workload; and (4) general attitudes toward cockpit automation are emphasized. The limitations of the air traffic control (ATC) system on the ability to utilize the advanced features of the new aircraft are discussed. In general the pilots are enthusiastic about flying an advanced technology aircraft, but they express mixed feelings about the impact of automation on workload, crew errors, and ability to manage the flight

The impact of cockpit automation on crew coordination and communication. Volume 1: Overview, LOFT evaluations, error severity, and questionnaire data

The purpose was to examine, jointly, cockpit automation and social processes. Automation was varied by the choice of two radically different versions of the DC-9 series aircraft, the traditional DC-9-30, and the glass cockpit derivative, the MD-88. Airline pilot volunteers flew a mission in the simulator for these aircraft. Results show that the performance differences between the crews of the two aircraft were generally small, but where there were differences, they favored the DC-9. There were no criteria on which the MD-88 crews performed better than the DC-9 crews. Furthermore, DC-9 crews rated their own workload as lower than did the MD-88 pilots. There were no significant differences between the two aircraft types with respect to the severity of errors committed during the Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) flight. The attitude questionnaires provided some interesting insights, but failed to distinguish between DC-9 and MD-88 crews